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NOTES
THE BLACK LUNG BENEFITS ACT-SIXTEEN TONS, WHAT
Do You GET?: How Do YOU DETERMINE A MINER HAS HAD A
MATERIAL CHANGE IN CONDITION TO ALLOW A SUBSEQUENT
CLAIM FOR BENEFITS?
INTRODUCTION
In 1969 the United States Congress passed the Black Lung
Benefits Act (BLBA) in order to compensate miners who have
been disabled by the lung disease pneumoconiosis (more commonly
known as black lung), and their spouses and dependent children. A
miner can apply for and receive benefits under the BLBA if the
miner satisfies the four elements of entitlement.! Due to the pro
gressive nature of pneumoconiosis, a miner suffering from the dis
ease may not satisfy the elements of entitlement at their first
application for benefits, but may be entitled to benefits at a later
time and can reapply if there has been a "material change"2 in the
miner's condition. 3 The Director of the Office of Worker's Com
pensation Programs (OWCP), an agency within the Department of
Labor, has promulgated regulations that state the requirements that
must be met in order to file a subsequent claim for benefits. These
regulations state that in order to bring a subsequent claim for black
lung benefits, a miner must prove that there has been a material
1. Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.c. § 901-945 (2000). The elements of entitle
ment require a miner to "establish[] that he or she (i) has pneumoconiosis, (ii) [t]he
pneumoconiosis arose out of coal mine employment, (iii) fils totally disabled, and (iv)
[t]he pneumoconiosis contributes to the total disability." 20 C.F.R. § 725.202(d) (2006)
(citations omitted).
2. The phrase "material change" is a vestige of the original version of the regula
tions governing the processing and adjudication of claims under the Black Lung Bene
fits Act. Claims for Benefits Under Part C of Title IV of the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Act, as Amended, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,732 (Apr. 25, 1978). While the language of
material change is not used in the current regulations, it is still used by the courts and
relevant to the discussion. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d); see, e.g., U.S. Steel Mining Co. v.
Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977, 979 (11th Cir. 2004); see also infra text accompanying notes
81-110.
3. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d).
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change in the miner's condition with respect to one of the elements
of entitlement previously adjudicated against the miner. 4
There has been controversy among the federal appeals courts
as to whether the Director's standard for the filing of subsequent
claims is proper, or whether it is too lax and does not respect the
finality of the original judgment. Due to this split in the circuits,
miners in different geographical locations are treated unequally
under the same law. s This Note will explore which is the most ap
propriate test for determining whether a miner making a subse
quent application for black lung benefits has had a material change
in condition since the original claim's denial. Inherent to the dis
cussion of this issue is an analysis to determine whether the Direc
tor's standard offends the principles of res judicata. This
determination will be explored in the context of the scope of judi
cial review of agency actions and regulations as dictated by the Ad
ministrative Procedure Act and the relevant case law on that issue.
Part I of this Note will examine the BLBA and the Department
of Labor regulations under that Act. Also in Part I, this Note will
delve into the area of administrative law and judicial deference to
agency regulations, as well as the doctrine of res judicata. Part II
will look at the cases representing the current split in the federal
courts of appeals, and how those courts have reached their respec
tive positions. Finally, Part III will look at the controversy and dis
cuss whether the "one element" test is indeed the appropriate and
applicable test for determining whether a miner has shown a mate
rial change in condition.
Hypothetical Fact Pattern
Mr. Murphy, a hypothetical miner, lives and works in Wyo
ming, a state within the Tenth Circuit, and has already been denied
a claim for black lung benefits, as he did not meet all four elements
of entitlement at the time of his first claim. Mr. Murphy has
worked in a subterranean mine for ten years, and suffers greatly
from pneumoconiosis. Though he had some symptoms and adverse
effects from the disease at the time of his original claim, he has
4. Id. §§ 725.202(d), 725.309(d).
5. Compare U.S. Steel Mining Co., 386 F.3d 977 (holding that the one-element
test was the appropriate test to determine whether a miner could bring a subsequent
claim for benefits), with Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the one-element test violated the principles of res judicata, and was not
appropriate for determining whether a miner has had a material change in conditions to
warrant a subsequent claim).
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since become totally disabled by it. Not only can he no longer ob
tain gainful employment, but regular activities in his every day life
are difficult and he is almost always short of breath. In his original
claim, elements of entitlement were decided against him.
Now, a year after his first claim was denied, he is eligible to
make a subsequent application for benefits if he can show a mate
rial change in his condition. However, because he is in the Tenth
Circuit, he will need to show a material change in all the elements
of entitlement decided against him in his original claim. In contrast,
if Mr. Murphy lived outside the Tenth Circuit, he would only have
to show a material change in one of the elements of entitlement
adjudicated against him in his original claim. Because the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has broken with its sister circuits, and
does not apply the test adopted by the Director of the OWCP, he
must meet the more stringent standard applied by the Tenth Cir
cuit. Therefore, this hypothetical miner will need to persuade the
court to abandon its material change test and adopt the Director's
one-element test.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Black Lung Benefits Act and its Legislative History

A.

1.

The 1969 Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act

In 1969, the United States Congress passed the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act as part of a large initiative to compen
sate miners in the wake of a devastating mine explosion. 6 This ex
plosion brought the plight of coal miners to public attention and
raised concern for the health and safety of miners and the well
being of their families (specifically, their spouses and dependent
children).7 While the explosion did not specifically bring to light
the problem of black lung among miners, it raised public awareness
regarding the hardships suffered by miners as a result of their work
ing conditions; one of these hardships is pneumoconiosis. s This fed
eral initiative to compensate miners was originally intended to
spark action on the state level, while providing federal compensa
tion until those states with large coal mining industries could pro
6. H.R. REP. No. 91-563 (1969), as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2503.
The Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 included the first incarnation of
the federal black lung benefits scheme. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, tit. IV, 83 Stat. 742, 792-98.
7. H.R. REP. No. 91-563, as reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2503.
8.

Id.
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vide their own funds to support miners within their state. 9
However, the state governments have not risen to the expectations
of the federal government, and as the Director of the owep has
yet to approve a state compensatory program, compensation for
pneumoconiosis remains, for all intents and purposes, completely
federal. 10
2.

The Process of Receiving Benefits

The Department of Labor regulations provide, as a preliminary
matter, that any person who believes that they are entitled to bene
fits under the BLBA may apply for such benefits.11 If a miner satis
fies the elements of entitlement, the miner is entitled to receive
benefits payable as of the. month when total disability occurred. 12
The regulations state that any person over the age of eighteen is
considered to be competent to file his or her own claim, but also
provide that another person may make a claim on behalf of some
one judged to be incompetent under the regulations,13 To make a
claim, the claimant must either be living or must have filed an in
tention to make a claim within six months before their death,14 In
the latter situation, the claimant's authorized representative may
continue with the claim in his or her stead. IS
The Department of Labor regulations state that a claim can be
filed by mail with any of the district offices of the Social Security
Administration, or any office of the Department of Labor author
ized to accept claims. 16 In the case of a claimant residing outside of
the United States, the claim may be filed with the Foreign Service,17
A claim is considered to have been filed on the day that it was de
livered, unless that would affect the party's rights, in which case a
legible postmark will establish the date the claim was filed. IS A
9. Jessica L. Toler, Note, Dead Canaries: The Struggle of Appalachian Coal Min
ers to Get Black Lung Benefits, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 163, 178 (2002).
10. Eric R. Olson, Note, Reducing the Overburden: The Doris Coal Presumption
and Administrative Efficiency Under the Black Lung Benefits Act, 99 MICH. L. REV.
696, 706 (2000).
11. 20 C.F.R. § 725.301(a) (2006).
12. Id. § 725.503(b).
13. Id. § 725.301(c).
14. Id. §§ 725.301(d), 725.305(c).
15. Id. § 725.305(a). This regulation provides that the written notice is treated as
a claim for purposes of § 725.301, and therefore, the claim may be continued after the
miner's death. Id. § 725.305.
16. Id. § 725.303(a)(1).
17. Id.
18. Id. § 725.303(b).
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miner may file a claim within three years of a determination that he
is totally disabled, and there is no time limit on a survivor claim for
benefits.19 The regulations provide a presumption that a claim was
timely filed; however, time limits may not be waived or tolled, ex
cept in extreme cases. 2D
A claim for benefits under the BLBA may be decided on its
merits by a district director. 21 After the determination by the dis
trict director, a party22 has a right to a hearing on a contested issue
of fact or law 23 and a party may request such a hearing after the
completion of proceedings before the district director. 24 That hear
ing will take place before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),2s
within seventy-five miles of the claimant's residence,26 and will lead
to resolution of the contested issue by the presentation of oral, writ
ten, and documentary evidence. 27 After the hearing, the judge's or
der becomes final thirty days after it is filed, unless appealed, or
unless the parties move for reconsideration. 28 A party may also ap
peal his or her claim to the Benefits Review Board before the deci
sion becomes final.2 9 After a final order has been entered by the
Benefits Review Board, an aggrieved party may appeal to the fed
eral court of appeals in the circuit where the injury (exposure to
coal dust resulting in black lung) occurred. 3D
3.

Pneumoconiosis

Because the purpose of the BLBA is to compensate miners dis
abled by pneumoconiosis, the Department of Labor Regulations
adopt a broad definition of this term. 31 The BLBA's definition is
substantially more inclusive than a medical definition would be,32
19.
20.
21.

Id. § 725.308(a).
Id. § 725.308(c).
Id. § 725.401.

22. The regulations state that the following people are parties to claims made
under the Black Lung Benefits Act: 1) the claimant, 2) an authorized representative of
the claimant, 3) the coal mine operator, 4) any insurance carrier of the coal mine opera
tor, and 5) the Director of the OWCP. Id. § 725.360.
23. Id. § 725.450.
24. Id. § 725.451.
25. Id. § 725.452(a).
26. Id. § 725.454(a).
27. [d. §§ 725.455-.456.
28. Id. § 725.479.
29. [d. § 725.481.
30. [d. § 725.482.
31. 30 U.S.c. § 901 (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 718.201 (2006).
32. 30 U.S.c. § 902(b) (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a).
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stating that pneumoconiosis is "a chronic dust disease of the lung
and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments,
arising out of coal mine employment."33 The definition of pneumo
coniosis found in the Department of Labor regulations closely mir
rors the definition adopted by the U.S. Congress in the BLBA.34
This broad definition furthers the asserted goal of Congress, which
is to compensate miners for their injuries and aid in the support of
their spouses and minor children. 35
4.

The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972

The original 1969 statute has been amended significantly three
times since it was passed. In 1972 Congress amended the statute to
broaden the coverage through the introduction of an additional
statutory presumption to aid a miner in proving the elements of
entitlement. 36 Among the biggest changes in the expansion of cov
erage under the 1972 Amendment was the provision of benefits to
the orphans or dependent children of a miner who died from pneu
moconiosisY The Senate Report stated that this amendment was
designed to correct an anomaly under the original BLBA, by which
a child of a disabled or deceased miner, whose other parent had
also passed, could not receive benefits under the Act, because the
statutory language provided benefits only to a miner's widow. 38
The 1972 Amendment also added a new statutory presumption
of entitlement under the Act. Before enacting the 1972 Amend
ment, a presumption of entitlement attached if a miner worked in
an underground coal mine for ten years or more, or if such a miner
died due to pneumoconiosis after working in a coal mine for ten or
more years, a rebuttable presumption attached that his pneumocon
33. 30 u.s.c. § 902; see Olson, supra note 10, at 712-15.
34. 20 c.F.R. § 718.201(a) (,"[P]neumoconiosis' means a chronic dust disease of
the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out
of coal employment."). The regulations make a distinction between "clinical" and "le
gal" pneumoconiosis; however, they clearly state that the overall definition of pneumo
coniosis encompasses both. Id.
35. 30 U.S.c. § 90l.
36. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 12-13 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N 2305,
2316-17.
37. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (codified as
amended at 30 U.S.c. § 922 (2000)).
38. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 7-8, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2311-12. The
Amendment also provides that in the absence of a widow or dependent child, benefits
being paid to a disabled miner may be paid at his death to any dependent parents or
siblings the miner may have. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. 150.
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iosis was due to mining.39 The original 1969 Act also contained a
third statutory presumption, based on X-ray diagnosis of a certain
type, that pneumoconiosis was the cause of disability or death.40 In
1972 a fourth statutory presumption was added to create a rebutta
ble presumption of pneumoconiosis regardless of a negative chest
X-ray if a miner had worked in an underground coal mine for at
least fifteen years (or a surface miner working in similar conditions)
and shows other signs or symptoms of pneumoconiosis. 41 The pre
sumption is that the miner suffers from and is disabled by pneumo
coniosis, even if his X-ray is read as negative for the disease. 42 The
Senate Report also provides that both houses of Congress had in
tended to allow these benefits to surface miners, who are equally as
afflicted as underground miners, but who had been neglected by
this program. 43 This oversight was remedied by striking the phrase
"underground" and providing benefits for all afflicted coal
miners.44
The 1972 Amendment also sought to increase the level of com
pensation available to miners by broadening the definition of "total
disability" for the purpose of black lung benefits.45 Up to this point
the definition of "total disability" was found in Title II of the Social
Security Act, but Congress felt the definition there was too restric
tive and effectively denied benefits to those people intended to re
ceive them.46 The relevant Social Security definition provided that
total disability was an "inability to engage in any substantial gainful
39.

Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173,

§ 411(c), 83 Stat. 742, 793.

40. Id.
41. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 86 Stat. at 154 (codified as amended at 30
U.S.c. § 921 (2000 & Supp. III 2003».
42. Id. The Legislative History provides that this presumption is necessary due to
the fact that an X-ray showing that the miner is negative for pneumoconiosis would
preclude any further processing of a claim for benefits. Evidence of post-mortem find
ings of black lung has urged commentators to favor less reliance on X-ray diagnoses,
which seem to be less reliable than previously thought. As such, this provision expands
the ability to prove pneumoconiosis by allowing other tests to establish the affliction. S.
REP. No. 92-743, at 11-16, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2315-20.
43. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 22-23, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2326-27.
44. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, § 3, 86 Stat. at 153 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 30 U.S.c.). "[Allowing benefits only to underground miners] is
grossly unfair and was not intended by the legislation passed by the Senate in 1969 ....
The Committee amendment remedies this unfair treatment." S. REP. No. 92-743, at 22,
as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2326.
45. Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, § 4, 86 Stat. at 153 (codified as amended at
30 U.S.c. § 902 (2000».
46. S. REP. No. 92-743, at 16-17, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2320.
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activity."47 However, Congress found that in practice this kept min
ers from receiving the benefits they were entitled to, because they
were able to engage in gainful activity, even if not physically able to
engage in mining.48 In many coal mining areas, there is no realistic
opportunity for employment outside of mining, and even if there is
an opportunity, it is rarely for comparable wages. 49 As a result,
many miners were unable to receive benefits because they could
work, but they were unable to find work outside the mining indus
try.50 After the 1972 Amendment, the definition of "total disabil
ity" for black lung benefits reflected the intention that a miner who
could no longer mine should receive the benefits provided to af
flicted coal miners by this federal statute. 51
5.

The 1977 Black Lung Benefits Reform Act

In 1977 Congress amended the BLBA again. This time it cre
ated the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund to better provide funding
for the benefits program. 52 This Amendment also levied an excise
tax on coal mining. 53 The revenue raised by this tax would help pay
benefits under the Act by funding the Black Lung Disability Trust
Fund. 54 The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund and the excise tax
on mining were needed in part because the states had not risen to
Congress's expectation that they would formulate plans for helping
to support disabled miners on the state level,55 Also, the Trust
Fund shifted the primary burden of administering this benefit plan
47. Id. at 16, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.AN. at 2320.
48. Id. at 16-17, as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.AN. at 2320-21.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, § 4,86 Stat. 150, 153
(codified as amended at 30 U.S.c. § 902 (2000». A miner is totally disabled when
"pneumoconiosis prevents him from engaging in gainful employment requiring the
skills and abilities comparable to those of any employment in a mine or mines in which
he previously engaged with some regularity and over a substantial period of time." Id.
52. Donald T. DeCarlo, The Federal Black Lung Experience, 26 How. L.J. 1335,
1342-45 (1983). The Black Lung Disability Trust Fund was created to assume liability
for payments due to disabled miners and survivors whose last coal mine employment
was before January 1, 1970, when the last employment was after that date but no re
sponsible coal operator could be found to assume liability, or if the operator responsi
ble refused to make payments. Id. at 1343; Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-227, § 3, 92 Stat. 11, 13 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.c. § 9501(d)
(2000».
53. Black Lung Benefits Revenue Act of 1977, § 2, 92 Stat. at 11-12.
54. DeCarlo, supra note 52, at 1342-46.
55. Id. at 1342-43.
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to the coal industry, as originally intended by Congress. 56 This be
came necessary due to the Department of Labor's inability to effec
tively distribute benefits amidst contestation by the coal
operators.57 After the 1977 Amendment, the Black Lung Disability
Trust Fund was responsible for the payment of black lung claims. 58
However, coal operators sought to take advantage of the Trust
Fund, by shifting the burden of paying claims solely to the Trust
Fund, and away from the insurance policies purchased by the
operators. 59
This Amendment was also an attempt to further the goal of
compensation by removing several of the more restrictive provi
sions, expanding the definition of the term "miner," and extending
the statute of limitations on claims for benefits to three years from
the date of injury.6o These changes expanded the definition of
"miner" to include not only surface and underground miners, but
also self-employed miners, and coal mining support staff-but only
if they had been exposed to coal dust over the course of their em
ployment. 61 This Amendment also added a fifth rebuttable pre
sumption-that a deceased miner who had worked for twenty-five
years or more in a coal mine had died due to pneumoconiosis. 62 It
was clear by this Amendment that Congress preferred over-inclu
sive compensation to under-inclusive compensation, and further ev
idenced the intent of Congress to provide effective compensation to
miners suffering from pneumoconiosis.
The 1977 Amendment to the BLBA was tremendously success
ful in increasing the number of miners who received benefits; how
ever, it also caused numerous problems. 63 The main problem was
that this amendment left the door wide open for coal mine opera
tors to try to shift the burden to the Black Lung Disability Trust
56. Id. at 1343; see also S. REP. No. 92-743, at 19 (1972), as reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2305, 2323.
57. DeCarlo, supra note 52, at 1343.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1346.
60. Id. at 1343-45, 1343 n.40.
61. Id. at 1344-45; Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239,
§ 2, 92 Stat. 95, 95 (1978) (codified as amended at 30 U.S.c. § 902(d) (2000»
('''[M]iner' means any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or
coal preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal. Such term also in
cludes an individual who works or has worked in coal mine construction or transporta
tion in or around a coal mine, to the extent such individual was exposed to coal dust as
a result of such employment.").
62. Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, § 3, 92 Stat. at 96 (1978).
63. DeCarlo, supra note 52, at 1346.
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Fund. 64 The coal mine operators used the Trust Fund to avoid pay
ing benefits if they were liable to a miner who was eligible for bene
fits through the Social Security Administration. 65 The coal
operators argued that any claim that was approved by the Social
Security Administration should be paid from the Black Lung Disa
bility Trust Fund and not from the operator's insurance policy; a
position largely accepted by ALJs and the Benefits Review
Board. 66 Although these concerns, among others, resulted in con
siderable litigation, these issues were largely resolved by the 1981
Amendment to the BLBA.67
6.

The Black Lung Benefits Amendment of 1981

The 1981 Amendment scaled back the compensation provided
by the BLBA, albeit only slightly. Three of the five statutory pre
sumptions were removed, making it tougher for miners to prove
entitlement under the Act. 68 This amendment also changed the ad
ministration of the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund by transfer
64. /d.
65. Id. Employers also tried to place the blame for lung conditions on the miners'
cigarette smoking. However, the rebuttable presumptions largely precluded this as a
line of argument, and still allowed disabled miners to recover under the Act. Id. at
1347.
66. Id. at 1342-46.
67. /d. at 1350-59.
68. Id. at 1350-51. The Black Lung Benefits Act currently provides only two stat
utory presumptions for finding entitlement under the BLBA:
1. A miner who suffers from black lung and was employed as a coal miner for ten
years or more enjoys the rebuttable presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose
from coal mining. 30 U.S.c. § 921(c)(1) (2000).
2. If a miner can show a specific type of mass, by X-ray or autopsy, there shall be
an irrebuttable presumption that he suffers from pneumoconiosis or that his death
was caused by pneumoconiosis. Id. § 921(c)(3).
The BLBA also provides that the following three statutory presumptions will not apply
to claims arising after 1981:
1. A miner who had been employed for ten or more years in a coal mine and dies
due to respiratory dysfunction enjoys the rebuttable presumption that he died due
to pneumoconiosis. /d. § 921(c)(2).
2. If a miner who had been employed in the underground coal industry for fifteen
or more years had a chest X-ray interpreted as negative for pneumoconiosis, any
other evidence that he was afflicted with black lung attaches a rebuttable presump
tion that he suffered from the disease. Id. § 921(c)(4) (Supp. III 2003).
3. Any miner who died prior to the enactment of the Black Lung Benefits Reform
Act of 1977 and was employed in the coal industry for twenty-five or more years
enjoys the rebuttable presumption that his death was caused by pneumoconiosis.
Id. § 921(c)(5).

2007]

SIXTEEN TONS, WHAT DO YOU GET?

507

ring control of this fund to the Internal Revenue Service. 69
Congress transferred the Trust Fund's administration because the
Trust Fund had been operated at a deficit for many years.70 Al
though the compensatory plan was changed slightly to make it more
difficult to gain benefits, the intent of Congress to compensate min
ers for their disability and to help support their spouses and chil
dren was still clear. If Congress had intended to completely
undercut the benefits provided, it would have removed all the statu
tory presumptions that aid a miner in proving entitlement.7 1 Fur
thermore, it was well within the power of Congress to eliminate
these benefits altogether, a path it did not take.
In general, the BLBA, as amended, requires coal mine opera
tors to provide benefits for their employees who are disabled by
pneumoconiosis.72 The Act also provides regulatory teeth by al
lowing the Department of Labor to levy a civil penalty of not more
than one thousand dollars for every day that the employer does not
comply with the Act's requirements of paying benefits.73 The Act
provides that an employer may secure the payment of benefits by
obtaining independent liability insurance, or by becoming a self-in
surer, qualified under the Act.7 4 However, the failure to obtain in
surance from an outside source or to become a self-insurer does not
relieve the employer of its statutory duty to provide benefits to its
workers.7 5 This provision solves the problem of coal mine opera

69. H.R. REP. No. 97-406, at 6 (1981), as reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2671,
2675.
70. Id.
71. 30 U.S.c. § 921(c) provides that two of the five original rebuttable statutory
presumptions are applicable to claims after 1981; the other three presumptions are not
applicable to new claims.
72. 30 U.S.c. § 933 (2000). This requirement applies to operators who operate a
coal mine in a state without a workers compensation law, providing benefits to miners
afflicted with black lung. Id. The statute requires a claim for black lung benefits be
filed under a state workers compensation program, if one exists. Id. § 931. But as
noted above, no state has enacted a benefits plan that has met with the approval of the
Secretary of Labor. Olson, supra note 10, at 706.
73. 30 U.S.c. § 933(d).
74. Id. § 933(a).
75. 20 c.F.R. § 726.4(b) (2006).
The failure of any such business entity to self-insure or obtain a policy or con
tract of insurance shall in no way relieve such business entity of its obligation
to pay pneumoconiosis benefits in respect of any case in which such business
entity's responsibility for such payments has been properly adjudicated.
Id.
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tors shifting the burden of paying black lung claims to the Black
Lung Disability Trust Fund.1 6
The BLBA as a whole is intended to compensate miners who
are injured in the course of their job by a disease that afflicts a
majority of career miners.17 It is also intended to aid those afflicted
miners in the support of their families. 78 Due to the disabling na
ture of pneumoconiosis and the fact that it will end miners' careers
by preventing them from obtaining other gainful employment, this
mechanism of federal and possible future state compensation is
necessary to the welfare of this group.79 The intent of Congress is
clear; compensation should be broad rather than narrow, and all
those entitled should be compensated under the BLBA.80
B.

The History of the Director's One-Element Test

The Director of the OWCP first proposed the rules containing
the one-element test, for determining whether a miner who had
been denied claims could bring a subsequent claim, in January of
1997. 81 To bring a subsequent claim for benefits under the BLBA, a
miner must show a material change in his condition since the denial
of his first claim. Under the Director's test, a material change in
condition is shown if the miner establishes a change in anyone of
the elements of entitlement previously adjudicated against that
miner. 82 The Director stated, in part, that the rules were meant to
resolve the questions raised by the decision in Wyoming Fuel Co. v.
Director, OWCP.83
1.

Why Change the Original 1978 Regulations?

The Department of Labor felt that the one-element test was
the proper way to determine whether a subsequent claim should be
allowed. 84 In formulating this opinion, it took into account the pro
76.
77.
78.

See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
30 U.S.c. § 901; see also Olson, supra note 10, at 712-15.
30 U.S.c. § 901.

79.
80.

[d.
[d. §§ 901-945.

81. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338, 3351-53 (proposed Jan. 22, 1997).
82. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006).
83. Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996); Regulations
Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62
Fed. Reg. at 3351-52.
84. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. at 3353. "Paragraph (d)(4) [of 20 C.F.R. § 725.309]
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gressive nature of black lung and stated that the "preclusive effect
of a previous denial ... should be limited."85 This amendment to
the previous 1978 regulations shows a change in mentality precipi
tating this change in the rules, as the original 1978 regulations re
quired that "a subsequent claim for benefits be denied on the
grounds of prior denial. "86 This complete prohibition against a
miner filing a new claim, even where a miner had a material change
or worsened condition, received much objection. In response, the
Department added a clause stating that the Deputy Commissioner
could allow such claims upon finding a material change in the
miner's condition. 87 The Director felt it necessary to propound the
amended regulations in 1997 due to the confusion and significant
litigation over the meaning of the wording of the material change
provision in the original 1978 regulations. 88
The Director felt that both the Tenth and Seventh Circuits
were applying too stringent a standard in deciding the material
change question. 89 The new rules explicitly adopted the one-ele
ment test by stating that once a miner had proven a material change
in one of the elements of entitlement previously adjudicated against
him, then the relitigation of issues of entitlement to benefits is no
longer precluded. 90
2.

The First Proposed Rules

The original formulation of the proposed regulations in 1997
went much farther than the simple institutions of the one-element
test; it also sought to make compensation easier for a miner to ob
tain by creating a rebuttable presumption of a material change in
condition. 91 Not only did the regulations state that a miner need
only prove a material change or worsened condition in one of the
elements of entitlement previously adjudicated against him, but
upon that showing a rebuttable presumption would attach that the
recognizes that, once a change in one of the applicable conditions [of entitlement] has
been established, the relitigation of issues previously decided is not precluded." ld.
85. Id. at 3352.
86. Id. at 3351 (citing Claims for Benefits Under Part C of Title IV of the Federal
Mine Safety and Health Act, as Amended, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,743 (Apr. 25, 1978». This
language operated to completely preclude a subsequent or duplicate claim for benefits
under the BLBA.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 3351-52.
90. ld. at 3353.
91. ld. at 3352.
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miner's physical condition had changed since the prior denial.92
The proposed rules forbade operators from rebutting the presump
tion by taking a position contrary to the one they adopted in the
prior litigation. 93 As such, to rebut the presumption, the coal mine
operator or fund would have to prove that the miner's condition
had not changed, rather than the miner having to prove that his
condition had changed. 94
This presumption effectively shifted the burden of proof in the
subsequent adjudication. If the miner could show a material
change in one element of entitlement, a presumption of change
arose. However, even if the coal operator or fund properly rebut
ted the presumption, the claimant would still be entitled to benefits
if he could show that his physical condition, even if it was totally
disabling before, had significantly deteriorated since that claim.95
A presumption not properly rebutted would require the fact-finder
to consider all the "relevant evidence of record," including the evi
dence from the prior litigation, to determine the claimant's entitle
ment. 96 This presumption was ultimately abandoned by the
Director because of concerns raised by interested parties during the
comment phase of the rulemaking. Thus, the final regulations,
adopted in 2000, were not as they appeared in 1997.
3.

The Second Proposed Rules

The Director of the OWCP released a second set of proposed
rules in October of 1999, amending the 1997 proposed rules
slightly.97 This second set of proposed rules still contained the one
element test,98 but lacked the burden-shifting rebuttable presump
92. [d.
93. Id.
[W]here the operator argued in the prior claim that the miner was not totally
disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of coal mine employment, it may
not, in an attempt to rebut the presumption of a change in the miner's condi
tion, argue that substantial evidence in the prior claim supported a benefit
award.
Id.
94. Id. "Once invoked, the presumption may be rebutted if the party opposed to
the claimant's entitlement demonstrates that the denial of the prior claim was errone
ous as a matter of law." Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (proposed Oct. 8, 1999) (codified as amended at
20 c.F.R. pts. 718, 722, 725, 726, 727 (2006)).
98. Id. at 54,968; 20 C.F.R. § 725.309 (2006).
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tion that attached on a showing of material change in one element
of entitlement. 99
The Director noted in this second set of proposed rules that the
Seventh Circuit had acquiesced to the agency's position, by adopt
ing the one-element test. IOO The Director also noted that the only
circuit that had not deferred to the one-element test was the Tenth
Circuit. lOl Therefore, the Director stated that the proposed rules
"merely codifie[d] case law that is already applicable to more than
90 percent of the claimants who apply for black lung benefits."lo2
4.

The Promulgation of Final Rules

The Department promulgated its final set of rules, after re
viewing the relevant comments, via publication in the Federal Regis
ter in December of 2000. 103 This pUblication represents the rules
and regulations now codified in the Code of Federal Regulations,
and stands as the body of administrative law that determines
whether or not a miner can bring a subsequent claim for benefits.104
These rules clearly state that in order for a miner to bring a subse
quent claim for benefits, he need only satisfy the Director's one
element test. lOS
The Director again noted that the majority of federal appellate
courts that have dealt with the issue of what a miner must show to
establish a material change in their condition have adopted the Di
rector's one-element test.1 06 The Tenth Circuit is the only circuit
that has not adopted this test and continues, even after the promul
gation of these final rules, to use its own test for determining a ma
terial change in a miner's condition. 107
99. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,984.
100. Id.; see Peabody Coal Co. v. Spese, 117 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1997).
101. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. at 54,984.
102. Id.
103. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20, 2000) (codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 718,
722, 725, 726, 727 (2006».
104. Id.
105. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309 (2006).
106. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,968.
107. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 89 Fed. App'x 152 (10th Cir.
2004) (upholding the holding of Wyo. Fuel in an unpublished opinion).
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The Director also explicitly stated that the one-element test
does not offend the concepts of res judicata and issue preclusion. lOS
This cuts against the Tenth Circuit's stated reason for not deferring
to the agency's interpretation of its own regulations.1 09 The Direc
tor has taken the position that the one-element test properly weighs
the need for claim preclusion and respect for final judgments with
the reality of pneumoconiosis being a progressive disease.u o
C.

Res Judicata

The doctrine of preclusion rests on the notion that final judg
ments should be respected and not circumvented lightly.111 The
doctrine of res judicata requires a binding and final judgment
before it will interfere with a subsequent or potential claim.1 12 In
general, when a binding and final judgment is rendered, it can affect
the parties in three ways: 1) a judgment for the plaintiff extin
guishes the claim and merges it into the judgment; 2) a judgment
for the defendant extinguishes the claim and bars further action on
that claim; and 3) a judgment in favor of either party is conclusive
between them, on the same or different claims, to the extent that
the issue was actually litigated and determined between them. l13
If a final and valid judgment is rendered in favor of the defen
dant, although the claim is generally extinguished and barred by
108. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,972-73.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 79,972-74.
111. Michael Wells, Naked Politics, Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of Accept
able Arguments, 47 EMORY L.J. 89, 101-03 (1998). "Finality demands that, once the
designated court decides an issue, other tribunals must respect the holding and may not
reexamine it at the request of a disappointed litigant. ... Finality is the value served by
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel." Id. at 101-02. The term res judi
cata, or claim preclusion, refers to the binding effect that a final judgment in one action
affects or disallows a new action on that same claim. FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 590-91 (3d ed. 1985). The term collateral estoppel,
or issue preclusion, refers to the effect that a final judgment in one action has in pre
cluding a litigant from raising issues decided or not decided in one action, in future
litigation. Id. Res judicata and collateral estoppel "[b]oth involve the conclusive effect
of judgments in subsequent actions. The difference lies in the fact that in res judicata
that subsequent suit involves the same cause of action, while in collateral estoppel the
subsequent suit involves a different cause of action." MILTON D. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL
PROCEDURE 234 (2d ed. 1979).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (1982). "However, for the
purposes of issue preclusion ... 'final judgment' includes any prior adjudication of an
issue in another action that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclu
sive effect." Id.
113. Id. §17.
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that judgment, there are several general exceptions to the rule of
bar. 1l4 A final and valid judgment will not bar relitigation if that
judgment is based on: 1) "a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for
improper venue, or for non-joinder or misjoinder of parties,"115 2)
when a non-prejudicial non-suit is entered,116 3) "when by statute
or rule of court the judgment does not operate as a bar to another
action on the same claim,"117 or 4) when the judgment for the de
fendant rests on the fact that the plaintiff's claim was premature, in
this case the plaintiff may begin litigation again when the claim has
matured.H s
Defining the scope of a "claim" is crucial to the doctrine of
preclusion. This is because the scope of that term affects what ac
tions can be brought and what actions are precluded by the previ
ous litigation. When a claim is extinguished under the rules of
merger 119 and bar,12° the extinguished claim includes any and all
rights the plaintiff would have to remedies against the defendant
arising from the transaction or series of transactions that gave rise
to the original cause of action litigated. 121 The terms "transactions"
and "series of transactions" are to be determined "pragmatically,"
giving consideration to how the "facts are related in time, space,
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit and
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expecta
tions or business understanding or usage. "122 A claim should be
precluded even if the plaintiff is prepared to offer different evi
114.
115.
116.

117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§§ 19-20.
§ 20(1)(a).
§ 20(1)(b).
§ 20(1)(c).
§ 20(2).
§ 18.
§ 19.
§ 24.
§ 24(2). In explaining the pragmatic standard that should be used in de

/d.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
fining a claim for preclusion, the American Law Institute stated,
[U]nderlying the standard is the need to strike a delicate balance between, on
the one hand, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing liti
gation to a close and, on the other, the interest of the plaintiff in the vindica
tion of a just claim.

In general, the expression connotes a natural grouping or common nu
cleus of operative facts .... If there is a substantial overlap, the second action
should ordinarily be held precluded. But the opposite does not hold true;
even when there is not substantial overlap, the second action may be pre
cluded if it stems from the same transaction or series.
Id. § 24 cmt. b.
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dence and theories of liability, or to seek different relief in the sec
ond action. 123
D.

Administrative Law and Judicial Deference
1. General Background on the Administrative Procedure
Act

In the 1940s, against a backdrop of rapid agency expansion, the
United States Congress passed the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).u4 This Act was passed to establish a default system of pro
cedures and requirements that must be observed by an agency un
less the congressional statute creating an agency provides different
procedures or requirements. 125 The APA also replaces the tradi
tional notions of judicial review with an explicit system of statutory
rules of judicial review of agency actions. 126 Overall, the APA em
bodies the congressional intent of instituting a system of judicial
review that provides aggrieved parties the right to judicial review
but also grants deference to an agency presumably composed of ex
perts in a particular field. 127
2.

Notice and Comment Rulemaking

The APA defines the requirements an agency must follow
when creating a rule. 128 Congressionally created agencies can cre
ate rules that apply to the public as a whole or to the community
the agency is meant to regulate.n 9 The definition of a "rule" for
the purposes of the APA is very broad,13° but in the common un
123. Id. § 25.
124. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-401, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237
(1946).
125. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596, 701-706 (2000); H. REP. No. 79-1980, at 16-18 (1946), as
reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1195, 1204-06.
126. 5 U.S.c. § 706. In the absence of different standards of review, made appli
cable to an agency's action by the act of Congress establishing that agency, this section
establishes the role of the judiciary in reviewing agency action.
127. H. REP. No. 79-1980, at 17, as reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1205; BER
NARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 584-86 (2d ed. 1984) ("[T]wo overriding con
siderations have combined to narrow the scope of [judicial] review [of agency action].
The first is that of deference to the administrative expert. . .. The second consideration
... is that of calendar pressure.").
128. 5 U.S.c. § 553.
129. Id.
130. Id. § 551.
"[R]ule" means the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or par
ticular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or pre
scribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice
requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the

2007]
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derstanding of the term, a rule is an agency regulation with the
"force and effect of law."13l Most administrative rule making is ac
complished by the mechanism of notice and comment rulemaking
or informal rulemaking. 132 Simply put, an agency must publish pro
posed rules in the Federal Register, putting any interested parties on
notice that the agency plans to promulgate rules.133 The agency
must then give interested persons the opportunity to participate in
the making of the proposed rules by allowing for the submission of
written data and perhaps an oral hearing. 134 After the period for
comment has ended, the agency must then consider the "relevant
matter presented" and publish the final rules in the Federal Register
with a "concise general statement of basis and purpose."135 It has
also become settled in the law of administrative bodies that the ju
diciary can not require any more procedure on the part of an
agency than found in the APA.136
future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations
thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valu
ations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing on any of the foregoing.

Id.
131. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979). "In order for a regula
tion to have the 'force and effect of law,' it must have certain substantive characteristics
and be the product of certain procedural requisites." Id. at 301. "[T]he promulgation
of these regulations must conform with any procedural requirements imposed by Con
gress [in the Administrative Procedure Act, or the organic act that formed the agency]."
Id. at 303.
132. 5 U.S.c. § 553. The Department of Labor rules containing the Director of
the Office of Workers Compensation Programs' one-element test were promulgated by
this method of informal rule making. [d.; see Regulations Implementing the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338 (Jan. 22,
1997); Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (Oct. 8, 1999); Regulations Implementing the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20,
2000).
133. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b).
134. Id. § 553(c).
135. Id. §§ 553(c)-(d).
136. VI. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519, 524 (1978).
[5 U.S.c. § 553] established the maximum procedural requirements which
Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting
rulemaking procedures. Agencies are free to grant additional procedural
rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not
free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.
Id. But cf Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (imposing upon
the agency a requirement to generate a written record of proceedings, for the purposes
of judicial review, when the agency was not required to by the APA or its organic act).
This limited exception to the rule of not forcing procedures on an agency is for the sole
purpose of a court fulfilling its duty to review the validity of agency action, which is
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The BLBA, as amended, requires that the Secretary of Labor
prescribe appropriate regulations for the administration of the Act
in accordance with the informal rule making process set out in the
APA.B 7 In promulgating the rules that contain the one-element
test, the Secretary of Labor has complied with the procedural re
quirements of the APA for notice and comment rulemaking.l38 As
such, the Secretary's regulations are properly classified as substan
tive rules with the force and effect of law.B9
3.

Judicial Review of Agency Actions with the Force and
Effect of Law

The APA specifically provides how the judiciary is to review
the actions of agencies, and when and how the judiciary can set
those actions aside. 140 When reviewing an agency action, courts
generally apply the arbitrary or capricious standard of review. 141
Though the APA provides other grounds for invalidating an agency
action,142 and those other grounds provide for a cumulative re
view,143 for most notice and comment rules, it is typically the arbi
trary and capricious standard that is applicable to determine the
nearly impossible without a record to review. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 654 (1990).
137. 30 U.s.c. § 936(a) (2000).
138. 5 U.S.c. § 553; Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health
and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338 (proposed Jan. 22, 1997); Regu
lations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (Oct. 8, 1999); Regulations Implementing the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20,
2000).
139. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-04 (1979).
140. 5 U.S.c. § 706.
141. Id. "The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action
... found to be (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law .... " Id.
142. Id.
The reviewing court shall ... hold unlawful and set aside agency action ...
found to be ... (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immu
nity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law; (E) un
supported by substantial evidence in a case [of formal adjudication] or other
wise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute; (F) or
unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court [when the agency's organic statute of Congress
provides for such].
Id. An organic statute is a law that establishes an administrative agency. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1449 (8th ed. 2004).
143. Ass'n of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. V. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve, 745 F.2d 677 (D.c. Cir. 1984). Then Circuit Judge Scalia stated that "The
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validity of agency regulations. 144 Under this standard, a rule can be
held invalid only if it is found to be "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,"145 allowing
for a judicial check on agency action that is not reasonable or in
accord with the principles of law. The regulations containing the
one-element test have the force and effect of law, as they were
promulgated through a valid notice and comment rulemaking. 146
As such, these substantive rules are subject to review under the
APA provisions for judicial review. 147
II.

A.

PRINCIPAL CASES

Cases Refusing to Adopt the One-Element Test
1.

Sahara Coal Company v. OWCp148

This was the first case heard by a federal appellate court deal
ing with the applicable test for establishing a material change in
condition, for the purposes of bringing a subsequent claim for black
lung benefits. When Sahara Coal came before the court, the one
element test had not yet been offered by the Director as an inter
pretation of the regulations. 149 The court, applying the 1978 De
partment of Labor regulations, stated that unless the miner had
established a "material change in condition," the subsequent claim
was barred by the previous denial. 150
The court held that a material change in condition under the
regulations 151 meant
'scope of review' provisions of the APA, 5 U.S.c. § 706(2), are cumulative." Id. at 683
(citation omitted).
144. 5 U.S.c. § 706; see also id. § 553; FLORENCE HEFFRON WITH NEIL
McFEELEY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY PROCESS 311-13 (1983) (discussing
the scope of review for rules made under the 5 U.S.c. § 553 notice and comment
procedure).
145. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
146. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006); Regulations Implementing the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920 (Dec. 20,
2000); Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969,
as Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966 (Oct. 8, 1999); Regulations Implementing the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338 (proposed
Jan. 22, 1997).
147. 5 U.S.c. § 706.
148. Sahara Coal Co. v. OWCP, 946 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1991).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 556.
151. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d).
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either that the miner did not have black lung disease at the time
of the first application but has since contracted it and become
totally disabled by it, or that his disease has progressed to the
point of becoming totally disabling although it was not at the
time of the first application. 152

The court also held that new evidence proffered in the second
claim is not sufficient to establish a material change I53 because that
new evidence might only show that the original denial had been
erroneous, rather than demonstrating that a material change had
taken place, and that would constitute an impermissible attack on
the finality of the original judgmenP54
The Seventh Circuit plainly rebuked the Benefits Review
Board's interpretation of the material change provision in the De
partment of Labor Regulations. 155 The Board claimed that a mate
rial change in condition is established by "evidence which is
relevant and probative so that there is a reasonable possibility that
it would change the prior administrative result. "156 The court
stated that this standard made "mincemeat of res judicata" and was
"a plain misreading of the regulation."157
2.

Wyoming Fuel Co. v. Director, OWCpI58

The claimant in Wyoming Fuel came before the Tenth Circuit
on his subsequent claim for benefits, which was made in 1985. 159
The miner was denied benefits in his original claim, for failure to
establish any of the elements of entitlement. 16o The ALJ allowed
the subsequent claim on the finding that the miner had shown a
material change in his condition, a finding that was affirmed by the
Benefits Review Board. 161 The Wyoming Fuel Company appealed
the award of benefits on several grounds, including a challenge to
the standard the ALJ had used to determine whether a material
152. Sahara Coal Co., 946 F.2d at 556 (citing Lukman v. Dir., 896 F.2d 1248, 1253
(10th Cir. 1990)).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 556-57.
156. Id. at 556 (quoting Spese v. Peabody Coal Co., 11 Black Lung Rptr. 1-74, 1
76 (BRB 1988) (per curiam)).
157. Id. at 556-57.
158. Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996).
159. Id. at 1504.
160. Id.
161. ld.
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change in condition had occurred. 162 The Tenth Circuit rejected the
ALl's standard as violating the principle of res judicata. 163
The Tenth Circuit did not uphold the ALl's finding that a ma
terial change in condition had been demonstrated, holding the stan
dard used to determine that change to be invalid. 164 However, the
Tenth Circuit also did not agree with the other tests formulated to
determine a material change in condition. 165 They found that the
Seventh Circuit's Sahara Coal test was flawed because it
requires the claimant to argue against self-interest by imposing a
duty on the claimant to persuade the court that he or she did not
meet the elements of entitlement at the time of the prior denial,
even though when the claimant brought the prior claim he or she
alleged that the elements of entitlement were met. 166
The Tenth Circuit also found the Director's one-element test to
be flawed and refused to adopt it.167 The Tenth Circuit disagreed
with the Director, and found his standard to be flawed for four rea
sons, three of them relating to the doctrine of claim preclusion: 1)
The one-element test requires a claimant to prove too much, by
showing that they meet one element of entitlement, where they
should only need to prove that their condition has worsened, with
respect to each element of entitlement adjudicated against them; 2)
the Director's standard allows the claimant to present evidence not
presented at the prior hearing; 3) by allowing a claimant to proceed
only on the showing of a change in one element, it enables the
claimant to relitigate the prior claim without proving a change in
each particular element decided against them; and 4) the one-ele
ment test unlocks the entire record once a change has been shown
in one element of entitlement, allowing the claimant to relitigate
that prior denial. 168
With respect to reasons one and three, it seems as though the
court felt that the one-element test required too much proof and
too little proof, at the same time. The Court found that the test
required the miner to prove too much of a change in one element,
but allowed the miner to ignore the other elements adjudicated
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1508-09.
at 1509.
at 1510.
1510-11.
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against him, and thus would not apply the test.1 69 Instead, the
Tenth Circuit formulated its own test, which requires a claimant to
prove a material change in condition by showing a material change
in "each element that actually was decided adversely to the
claimant. "170
B.

Cases Adopting the One-Element Test
1.

Sharondale Co. v. Ross 171

This was the first case in which the Director of the OWCP ad
vocated for the one-element test for determining a material change
in condition.1 72 The Sixth Circuit stated that because courts owe
deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of that agency's
regulations, and because the Director's standard was reasonable,
the one-element test is the applicable test for determining a mate
rial change in condition. 173 The court held that the Director's inter
pretation of the material change provision was reasonable, stating,
it "takes into account the statutory distinction between a request
for a modification of the [Benefits Review] Board's decision and a
request for benefits based on a material change in condition."174
2.

Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow 175

In Labelle Processing, the Third Circuit rejected the Seventh

Circuit's Sahara Coal standard, and followed the Sixth Circuit in
adopting the one-element test.176 The court adopted this test on the
basis of deference owed to an agency's reasonable interpretation of
its own regulations. 177 However, the Third Circuit found the Direc
tor's standard to be reasonable on different grounds than the Sixth
Circuit had. 178 The Third Circuit upheld the standard because it is
in accord with the principle that "courts should liberally construe
remedial legislation ... to include the largest number of claimants
within its entitlement provisions. "179
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. at 1511.
Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993 (6th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 997-98.
Id. at 998.
Id.
Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 1995).
Id. at 317-18.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 318.
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Interestingly, the Third Circuit only briefly discussed res judi
cata, finding that if a miner establishes a material change in his con
dition since the prior denial, a new cause of action has arisen and
the second claim is thus not barred by res judicata. 18o The court
primarily accepted the Director's test as a matter of judicial defer
ence to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations, and the
principle that remedial legislation should be broadly construed.1 81

3.

Lisa Lee Mines v. Director, OWCp182

When Lisa Lee Mines first reached the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, the court adopted the Seventh Circuit's Sahara Coal stan
dard for determining a material change in condition.1 83 The Fourth
Circuit then vacated that opinion and granted a petition for rehear
ing en banc. 184 At the rehearing the court found that the Director's
one-element test was appropriate for determining a material change
in condition. 18s
The Fourth Circuit chose to defer to the Director's one-ele
ment standard as a matter of judicial deference to an agency's rea
sonable interpretation of its own regulations, as well as a matter of
practicality.1 86 The court found that the Director's standard
"strikes a reasonable balance" between the finality of the original
claim without subjecting a miner's health to a once in a lifetime
adjudication. 187 The Fourth Circuit rejected the Seventh Circuit's
Sahara Coal test as they did not agree with the theory of alternative
holdings embodied in that test, noting that by requiring a miner to
prove a "change on every element that was previously decided
against him," the law would be imposing the burden on the claim
ant to "file a meaningless appeal [just] to 'correct' [an] erroneous
alternative holding. "188
180. Id. at 313-14.
181. Id. at 318.
182. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir. 1996).
183. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 57 F.3d 402, 407 (4th Cir. 1995), vacated and
reh'g en banc granted, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32069 (4th Cir. 1995), award of benefits
affd, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir. 1996); see Labelle Processing Co., 72 F.3d at 317.
184. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 32069 (4th Cir. 1995)
(en banc).
185. Lisa Lee Mines, 86 F.3d at 1362-63.
186. Id. at 1362 ("The Director's standard, to which we owe deference, is easily
the most reasonable and workable of the lot.").
187. Id. at 1363.
188. Id. The alternative holdings idea, discussed by the court, basically addresses
the fact that a miner may have been denied benefits on more than one element of
entitlement in his original claim. The court exposed the flaw to the alternative holdings
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The only argument broached by the court against the adoption
of the one-element standard was that of the "perpetuallitigator."189
The court dismissed this argument because the reality is that the
black lung claims process is so slow that most miners don't have the
time on earth to make it through two claims and thus could not
litigate perpetually.190
4.

Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey191

The Eighth Circuit in Lovilia Coal decided that the Director's
one-element standard was proper on the basis of deference to an
agency's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations. 192 Fur
thermore, the court rejected the coal company's argument that the
. one-element standard violated due process because of its burden
shifting.193 The court found that the coal company's argument
that the fact presumed (material change) bears no rational relation
ship to the fact proved (new evidence of disease or disability)
ignores the proposition that pneumoconiosis is a progressive dis
ease. 194 The court did not discuss the competing standards formu
lated by the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, stating that even if those
tests were reasonable, the court "would be obligated to defer to the
Director's standard."195
5.

Peabody Coal Co. v. Spese 196

The Peabody Coal case was heard by the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals en banco The court took another look at the standard it
had formulated in Sahara Coal. 197 The court maintained that this
case did not represent a reversal of Sahara Coal, but merely a clari
idea by stating "[ilf [the minerlloses on one, or two, or three elements, the end result is
the same: a denial." Jd. This is due to the fact that a miner must prove each element of
entitlement. Jd. To require a miner to appeal each element would be a terrible burden
on the miner, which this court would not impose. Id.
189. Jd. at 1364. The Fourth Circuit cast the "perpetual litigator" as a "wily"
claimant with an equally "wily" lawyer that files claims "ad infinitum" despite lack of
success. Id.
190. Jd. ("Few miners have the time or wherewithal to go through the system
twice; all too many die during the first run.").
191. Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1997).
192. Jd. at 451-53.
193. Jd. at 453.
194.
195.

Jd.
Jd. at 454.

196.

Peabody Coal Co. v. Spese, 117 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir. 1997).

197.

Jd. at 1003.
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fication of the prior decision. 198 The court then adopted the Direc
tor's one-element standard, as articulated by the Sixth Circuit in
Sharondale Corp. v. ROSS.199 The Peabody Coal court stated that
the important distinction drawn in Sahara Coal was "between a sec
ond claim that merely attempts to relitigate the first one and a gen
uine showing of changed conditions."2oo
In that light, the court found that the one-element test does not
offend res judicata, so long as it respects the finality of the original
judgment and operates under the assumption that the original judg
ment was correct. 201 Thus if the "miner must show that something
capable of making a difference has changed," the Director's stan
dard is the correct one. 202 The Seventh Circuit held that the Direc
tor's test was proper so long as the one element that the miner
shows a change in might "independently have supported a deci
sion" against that claimant in the original claim.203

6.

u.s. Steel Mining Co.
u.s. Steel Mining, the

v. Director, OWCp204

In
Eleventh Circuit declined to follow
the Sahara Coal test, as urged by the coal company, finding that
they owed deference to the Director's consistent interpretation of
his own regulations. 205 The court held that this standard was rea
sonable and did not violate the principles of res judicata, because it
did not require a claimant to relitigate the issues of the prior com
plaint. 206 The one-element test did not require a claimant to com
pare "the evidence associated with the second claim with the
evidence presented at the first claim."207 Rather, the one-element
test required the claimant to compare new evidence with the "con
clusions reached in the prior claim," which are final, to determine
whether the miner's condition had changed since the prior de
nia1. 208 The court held that res judicata was not offended, and that
198. Id. at 1005. "[It) also became clear that clarification of our Sahara Coal
decision is desirable, as a number of our sister circuits appear to have misunderstood
what we require to show a 'material change in conditions' for purposes of second or
subsequent applications." Id.
199. Id. at 1009; Sharondale Corp. v. Ross, 42 F.3d 993, 997-98 (6th Cir. 1994).
200. Peabody Coal Co., 117 F.3d at 1007.
201. Id. at 1008.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1009.
204. U.S. Steel Mining Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004).
205. Id. at 984-88.
206. Id. at 988-89.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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the test was appropriate because this was a reasonable interpreta
tion of the regulations and was therefore entitled to judicial
deference. 209
III.

ANALYSIS

The proper test to determine whether a miner has had a mate
rial change in condition, and is thus allowed to bring a duplicate or
subsequent claim for benefits under the BLBA, is the Director's
one-element test. The Director has promulgated regulations con
taining this standard210 under a valid notice and comment rulemak
ing;211 as such, the courts are bound to follow these regulations
unless they can be set aside pursuant to the APA.212 Further, be
cause the one-element standard does not violate the doctrine of
claim preclusion, it is valid, and should be followed by the courts as
having the force and effect of law.
A.

Res Judicata
1.

The Tenth Circuit's Finding that the One-Element Test
Violates Res Judicata

Even though the Director of the OWCP has promulgated rules
that contain the one-element test, the Tenth Circuit might continue
to use res judicata as a means of not following the Department of
Labor's regulations. By a finding that the one-element test violates
the doctrine of claim preclusion, the Tenth Circuit could hold the
standard to be "otherwise not in accordance with the law" and set it
aside under the APA.2 13 This would allow the Tenth Circuit to up
hold their precedent and would not force them to use a standard
which they believe violates a doctrine entrenched in the law of this
country.
The Tenth Circuit has made perfectly clear that it feels the Di
rector's one-element test violates the doctrine of claim preclu
sion. 214 Although the Tenth Circuit has not yet dealt with a case
[d. at 990.
20 c.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006).
5 U.S.c. § 553 (2000).
212. [d. § 706.
213. [d. § 706(2)(A).
214. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 89 Fed. App'x 152 (10th Cir.
2004); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, No. 99-9562, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17415 (10th
Cir. July 18, 2000); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996).
209.

210.
211.
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arising under the newly promulgated rules,215 those rules do not
necessarily solve the issue of whether the Director's test will now be
followed by the Tenth Circuit. Most of the relevant case law where
an agency action is set aside as being not in accordance with the law
involves the violation of a federal statute. 216 However, a regulation
that is contrary to a common law rule could also be set aside as
being not in accordance with the law.
Prior cases have held that an agency regulation that violates a
common law principle would be found to be "not in accordance
with law" and set aside under the APA.217 Furthermore, in order to
change the common law by a statute, Congress must speak directly
to the issue of changing that common law rule. 2ls Therefore, the
statutory grant of authority to delegate, does not speak directly to
or evidence an intent to abrogate common law rules and must be
read to allow the OWCP to regulate only within the realm of com
mon law. 219 As such, the Tenth Circuit could hold that the regula
tion abrogates the principle of claim preclusion and is unlawful for
going beyond the jurisdiction given to the OWCP by Congress. 220
2.

a.

Why the One-Element Test Does Not Violate Res
Judicata

The View of the Director of the OWCP
It should not be surprising that the Director of the OWCP does

not think that his regulations are invalid for violating the doctrine
215. See generally Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358, 1364 (4th Cir.
1996) (discussing the slow nature of the black lung claims process).
216. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). See generally Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281
(1979) (holding that any disclosure of information by a federal agency, that violates the
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.c. § 1905, is not in accordance with the Freedom of Informa
tion Act); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Widnall, 57 F.3d 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (finding
that even though the Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.c. § 1905, does not confer a private
right of action on citizens, a violation of that Act by an agency can be the basis of
overturning action as not in accordance with law).
217. Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (The court
reversed the Patent Appeals Board for improperly setting aside a claim as barred by
claim preclusion. Because the second claim was not barred by the doctrine of preclu
sion, the agency's action was not in accordance with law, and was set aside.).
218. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993). It is a longstanding princi
ple that statutes which invade the common law must be read narrowly, with the pre
sumption that the common law rule is intact, unless it is clear that the legislative intent
was to abrogate that common law principle. Id. (citing Astoria Fed. Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Solimimo, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991».
219. See generally 30 U.S.c. § 921 (2000).
220. 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(C). (A court may hold unlawful, agency action "in excess
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right. ").
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of claim preclusion. When the Director of the OWCP published his
final rules in the Federal Register, he responded to the issue of claim
preclusion and advocated that these rules do not violate that doc
trine. 221 The Director argued that these regulations do not offend
the doctrine of res judicata because the doctrine's "applicability [to]
these principles was limited in two important respects. "222
First, the Director references the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act,223 which contains a liberal reopening
provision,224 and which has been expressly incorporated into the
BLBA by Congress.225 This reopening provision, formed by an act
of Congress and made applicable to miners suffering from black
lung, mitigates the effect of claim preclusion on the Director's regu
lations by allowing a claim to be reopened on the showing of a
change in conditions, and abrogating the common law doctrine of
res judicata.226 The United States Supreme Court has held that the
reopening provision of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Com
pensation Act does not violate the doctrine of claim preclusion. 227
The Court held that the relevant portion of the statute,228 which
allows for the reopening of a claim due to a change in conditions,
was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.229
The Court looked to the legislative history of the Longshore
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, and found that the pur
pose of this section of the Act was to allow for the modification of
an award if necessary to "render justice" under the Act. 230 The
221. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,972-73 (Dec. 20, 2000) (codified at 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.309 (2006)).
222. Id. at 79,972.
223. Id. (citing 33 U.S.c. §§ 901-950 (2000)).
224. 33 U.S.c. § 922 (2000).
225. 30 U.S.c. § 932(a) (2000).
226. 33 U.S.c. § 922.
227. Banks v. Chi. Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 u.S. 459 (1968).
228. The relevant portion read:
Upon his own initiative, or upon the application of any party in interest, on the
ground of a change in conditions or because of a mistake in a determination of
fact by the deputy commissioner, the deputy commissioner may, at any time
prior to one year after the date of the last payment of compensation, whether
or not a compensation order has been issued, or at any time prior to one year
after the rejection of a claim, review a compensation case in accordance with
the procedure prescribed [for original claims], and in accordance with such
section issue a new compensation order which may terminate, continue, rein
state, increase, or decrease such compensation, or award compensation.
Id. at 462 (quoting 33 U.S.c. § 922).
229. Id. at 465.
230. Id. at 464.
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Court further found that Congress had amended this provision after
enactment in order to enlarge the time frame for modification to
extend the authority to change awards in the interest of justice.231
Congress clearly intended this provision of the Longshore and Har
bor Workers' Compensation Act to allow for ample opportunity to
modify orders, with the hopes that entitled persons would be ade
quately compensated under the Act. 232 By incorporating this provi
sion into the BLBA, Congress has lessened the effects of claim
preclusion, and thus attempted to ensure that entitled miners are
compensated. 233 Because Congress has acted to mitigate the effects
of res judicata with respect to black lung compensation, the Direc
tor of the OWCP is correct in concluding that his regulations do not
violate res judicata,234 as it complies with the congressional man
date of ensuring that miners entitled to benefits receive those
benefits.
In his notice of final rules, the Director of the OWCP made a
second, more general, argument that his regulations do not violate
the concepts of claim preclusion. 235 The Director argued that be
cause an individual's eligibility for benefits is not fixed at a specific
moment in time, but changes due to the progressive nature of pneu
moconiosis, these claims may be subject to relitigation. 236 The Di
rector stated that under the principles of claim preclusion, a full and
fair opportunity to litigate a position in a final adjudication will pre
clude any subsequent relitigation of issues that could have been
raised in the originallitigation. 237 However, the Director then took
the position that the one-element standard238 embraces these
principles.
231. Id. at 464-65 (citing S. REP. No. 75-1988, at 8 (1938); H.R. REP. No. 75-1945,
at 8 (1938)).
232. See Banks, 390 U.S. at 464-65.
233. 30 U.S.c. § 932(a) (2000); see Dir., OWCP v. Peabody Coal Co., 554 F.2d
310,330 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding that reference to the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act, in the BLBA, is a general reference, and thus also encompasses
amendments passed to the Longshore Act, after the passage of the BLBA).
234. See Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act
of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920,79,972 (Dec. 20, 2000) (codified at 20 C.F.R.
§ 725.309 (2006)); Banks, 390 U.S. at 464-65.
235. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,972.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing Kremer v. Chern. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 481 n.22 (1982);
Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 476 (1998)).
238. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006).
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The one-element test, in application, will only allow a miner to
bring a subsequent claim if the material change shown is in an ele
ment of entitlement that is subject to change. 239 For example, if a
claim is denied on the sole basis that the claimant did not work as a
miner,240 that is a condition that is not subject to change. If the
miner does not allege that he has since worked as a miner, then he
has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim, and no sub
sequent claim will be allowed. 241 But, if the miner can show a
change in a given condition, established by evidence of a worsening
in that element of entitlement, he should be allowed a subsequent
claim for benefits because he has not had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate what is essentially a new cause of action.242 The doctrine
of res judicata is not violated under the Director's construction of
these regulations, because Congress has limited that doctrine to a
permissible extent and the regulations appropriately incorporate
the doctrine. 243

b.

The Third Circuit's construction of the one-element test

In Labelle Processing Co. ,244 the Third Circuit held that the
Director's one-element test was appropriate and did not violate the
doctrine of claim preclusion. 245 When a miner shows a material
change in condition, a new cause of action, not barred by res judi
cata, arises in the miner. 246 Even though a subsequent claim must
follow a previous claim, so long as a material change in condition is
demonstrated, the second claim is not barred because the new
cause of action is separate and distinct from the original,247 The
Court further determined that the Director's one-element test was
proper based on judicial deference to an agency's reasonable inter
pretation of its own regulations. 248
The Third Circuit also discussed the progressive nature of
pneumoconiosis at length as a reason why claim preclusion should
not operate to bar a duplicate or subsequent claim for benefits
239. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,972-73.
240. [d.
241. [d.
242. [d.
243. [d. at 79,972; 33 U.S.c. § 922 (2000).
244. Labelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308 (3d Cir. 1995).
245. [d. at 313-14.
246. [d.
247. [d.
248. Id. at 318.
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under the BLBA.249 A miner whose pneumoconiosis was latent at
the time of the original claim should be entitled to prove that his
disease has progressed since the denial of his original claim. 250
Whether a new cause of action has arisen is typically determined by
the "transaction" or "series of ... transactions" test, found in the
Second Restatement of ludgments. 251 In general, claims or causes
of action that arise out of the same "nucleus of operative facts" will
be considered barred by a previous final judgment. 252 After stating
the new facts, which arise after the original claim, such as a worsen
ing of conditions or becoming totally disabled by pneumoconiosis, a
new claim arises that is not precluded. 253 Because the Director's
one-element test allows a miner to relitigate his claim only on a
showing of a worsening of conditions, once that worsening is estab
lished, a new cause of action arises, which is not precluded by res
judicata.
Furthermore, the Director's one-element test is proper in light
of the "principle that courts should liberally construe remedial leg
islation. "254 This principle has been enunciated by the Supreme
Court and should be applied to the situation at hand. 255 Because
this statute is remedial in nature, and the Director's one-element
test advances the remedial purposes of the BLBA, the one-element
test should be used as it "include[s] the largest number of claimants
within its entitlement provisions. "256
c.

The Fourth Circuit's view

In Lisa Lee Mines, the Fourth Circuit found that the Director's
one-element test was proper and not contrary to the doctrine of
claim preclusion. 257 The one-element test does not direct that an
original claim will be a bar to subsequent litigation, but merely acts
as a rebuttable presumption that the original claim is final, unless a
miner can show that his condition has changed. 258 Thus, the one
249. Id. at 314-16.
250. Id. at 316.
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982).
252. Id. § 24 cmt. b.
253. Labelle Processing Co., 72 F.3d at 314.
254. Id. at 318.
255. Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380,403 (1991) (stating that courts should inter
pret remedial statutes broadly, to reach their remedial purposes); Employer's Liab.
Cases, 207 U.S. 463 (1907), superseded by statute, on other grounds, 35 Stat. 65 (1908).
256. Labelle Processing Co., 72 F.3d at 318.
257. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358 (4th Cir. 1996).
258. Id. at 1362-63.
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element test strikes a balance between finality and the reality that a
human's health is subject to change. 259 As such, should a miner be
denied benefits in his original claim it is presumed that the claim
was decided correctly and finally. However, because a person's
health is subject to change, by showing a material change in condi
tions, a miner should be allowed to bring a subsequent claim for
benefits. The Director's one-element test operates as a balance be
tween considerations of res judicata and the proposition that a per
son's health should not be subject to a once in a lifetime
adjudication. As such, the Director's test is appropriate and should
be adopted by the Tenth Circuit.
d.

The Eleventh Circuit's view

The Eleventh Circuit did not discuss the issue of claim preclu
sion at length, basing its decision to adopt the Director's one-ele
ment test on the grounds of deference to an agency's consistent
interpretation of its own regulations. 26o However, the court found
that claim preclusion was not offended by the test, because it does
not attack the finality of the original judgment, but rather uses the
conclusions reached in that judgment as a benchmark by which to
judge whether a material change in condition had occurred. 261 The
one-element test treats the first decision as final by adopting its
conclusions, and then compares those conclusions to the miner's
current state of health to determine whether a material change in
condition has occurred. 262 Because this respects the final decision
rendered, the test does not violate the principles of res judicata.
In fact, the Sahara Coal Co. test forces a miner to argue that
the first denial of benefits was correct, even though he had thought
he was entitled to benefits at that point. 263 Instead of calling for the
miner to compare the evidence presented in the first claim with the
new evidence, the one-element test only requires that the court
compare the new evidence with the final conclusions reached in the
first claim. 264 This "avoid[s] forcing a miner to take a position ...
that plainly contradicts the [position] he took in the first claim,"
259.

260.

Id.

u.s. Steel Mining Co. v.

Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004).

Id. at 988-89.
Id.
Id. at 989. The U.S. Steel Mining Company argued before the Eleventh Cir
cuit Court of Appeals for adoption of the Sahara Coal Co. test, rather than the Direc
tor's one-element test. Id. at 985.
264. Id. at 989.
261.
262.
263.

SIXTEEN TONS, WHAT DO YOU GET?

2007]

531

while still treating the first adjudication as final and binding. 265 As
such, the Director's test gives finality to the original judgment,
while taking into account the fact that a person's health is subject to
change through the course of a progressive disease. 266
B.

Mr. Murphy's Claim

Mr. Murphy is a hypothetical miner who resides and works in
Wyoming, a state in the Tenth Circuit. He has been denied benefits
under his first claim and now seeks to establish that his condition
has changed materially so that he will be allowed to make a subse
quent claim for benefits. The Tenth Circuit requires that he show a
material change in every element of entitlement that was decided
against him in his original claim.267 In contrast, the Director's one
element standard would allow Mr. Murphy to bring a subsequent
claim for benefits on the lesser showing that he has had a material
change in only one of the elements of entitlement previously de
cided adversely to him.268 Although the Tenth Circuit has not yet
decided a claim governed by the newly promulgated rules, which
contain the one-element test, the Circuit has not abandoned its po
sition, even when it was clear that the Director would incorporate
his test in the Code of Federal Regulations. 269
Our hypothetical miner should begin his argument before the
Tenth Circuit by stating that the Director's regulations, which con
tain the one-element test, have the force and effect of law. 270 While
it is true that these regulations were promulgated by a valid notice
and comment rulemaking,271 the Tenth Circuit may refuse to follow
265.
266.

[d.
[d.

267. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 89 Fed. App'x 152, 156 (10th Cir.
2004); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17415 (10th Cir. July 18,
2000); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996).
268. 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d) (2006).
269. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co., 89 Fed. App'x 152; see also Wyo. Fuel Co., 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 17415; Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and
Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed Reg. 3338, 3351-54 (Jan. 22, 1997); Regulations
Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 64
Fed. Reg. 54,966, 54,984-85 (Oct. 8, 1999); Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,972-73 (Dec.
20,2000).
270. See 20 C.F.R. § 725.309(d); 5 U.s.c. § 553 (2000).
271. See 5 U.S.c. § 553; 20 C.F.R. § 725.309; Regulations Implementing the Fed
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920; Regu
lations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as
Amended, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,966; Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969, as Amended, 62 Fed. Reg. 3338.
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them, on the grounds that they violate res judicata, and are thus not
in accordance with law. 272 The Tenth Circuit could also refuse to
follow these regulations on the ground that the Director lacks the
authority to abrogate the common law rules without the express
permission of Congress; therefore, the regulations purporting to
limit the effect of res judicata are in excess of his statutory jurisdic
tion.273 The Tenth Circuit may insist that, due to the Director's lack
of authority to abrogate res judicata, the regulations should be read
in accordance with the doctrine of claim preclusion, and the regula
tions are thus invalid for violation of the doctrine. 274 For these rea
sons, the fact that the Director promulgated regulations containing
his one-element test may not completely solve Mr. Murphy's
problems.
If the Tenth Circuit will not uphold the regulations on the
ground that they have the force and effect of law, Mr. Murphy
should respond by arguing that the one-element test does not vio
late the doctrine of claim preclusion, as the Tenth Circuit has found
it does. 275 To do so he can look to the other circuits that have up
held the one-element test as appropriate and not in violation of that
doctrine. He can follow the Third Circuit's reasoning that once a
miner has shown a material change in condition by way of the one
element test, a new cause of action accrues, which is not barred by
res judicata. 276 Furthermore, he can argue that the Third Circuit's
construction of this purely remedial BLBA should be construed lib
erally, so as to include the largest possible group of persons entitled
to receive the BLBA's statutory benefits.277 In these respects, the
one-element test does not violate res judicata, and the regulation
has the force and effect of law, and should be applied by the Tenth
Circuit as written.
Mr. Murphy could also look to the Fourth Circuit's reason
ing-that the one-element test is appropriate because the health of
a human is not subject to a "one shot" adjudication-to persuade
the Tenth Circuit to adopt the test.278 Furthermore, he can argue
that the one-element test creates a rebuttable presumption of final
272. 5 U.S.c. § 706(2)(A).
273. Id. §706(2)(C).
274. Id.
275. McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 89 Fed. App'x 152 (10th Cir.
2004); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Dir., OWCP, No. 99-9562,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17415 (10th
Cir. July 18, 2000); Wyo. Fuel Co. v. Oir., OWCP, 90 F.3d 1502 (10th Cir. 1996).
276. Labelle ProceSSing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 313-16 (3d Cir. 1995).
277. Id.
278. Lisa Lee Mines v. Dir., OWCP, 86 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (4th Cir. 1996).
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ity, by which a claimant is bound by the original decision, unless he
can show a material change in his condition. 279 The presumption
saves the one-element test from violating res judicata, because its
shows respect for the finality of the original judgment. Because the
one-element test respects the finality of the original judgment, the
only true requirement of res judicata, the test does not offend that
principle. 280
Under the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits' analyses, Mr. Murphy
could argue that the one-element test does not violate the doctrine
of claim preclusion, because it does not permit a collateral attack on
the final judgment rendered in the original denial.281 The one-ele
ment test does not allow a claimant to relitigate the original claim,
but merely uses the conclusions reached therein, to measure the
miner's current medical condition, to establish whether there has
been a material change in his condition; claim preclusion is not im
plicated by the test. 282
Although the Tenth Circuit has not found the Director's advo
cacy for his one-element standard persuasive in the past, Mr. Mur
phy could use the Director's arguments found in the notice of the
final rule. 283 He could argue that Congress' incorporation of the
reopening provision from the Longshore and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act,284 into the BLBA,285 abrogates the common
law doctrine of claim preclusion's applicability to the black lung
benefit scheme. Because the Supreme Court has found that the ap
plication of the reopening provision of the Longshoreman's Act,
does not violate res judicata,286 so too should the one-element test
be upheld as not violating the doctrine of res judicata.
Furthermore, the one-element test should be applied due to
the consideration it gives to the fact that pneumoconiosis is a pro
gressive disease, the effects of which are not set at one single
time. 287 When a material change in condition is shown, the miner's
279. Id. at 1363.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 111-123.
281. Lovilia Coal Co. v. Harvey, 109 F.3d 445, 450-51 (8th Cir. 1997); U.S. Steel
Mining Corp. v. Dir., OWCP, 386 F.3d 977 (11th Cir. 2004).
282. U.S. Steel Mining Corp., 386 F.3d 977.
283. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,972-73 (Dec. 20, 2000).
284. 33 U.S.c. § 922 (2000).
285. 30 U.S.c. § 932(a) (2000).
286. Banks v. Chi. Grain Trimmers Ass'n, 390 U.S. 459, 463-65 (1968).
287. Regulations Implementing the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of
1969, as Amended, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,972-73.
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condition is different from that litigated at the original claim, and
he should not be barred from litigating his current condition, which
he has not had an opportunity to litigate fairly and fully.288
CONCLUSION

In conclusion, since the one-element test has been codified in
the Code of Federal Regulations, through valid notice and com
ment rulemaking, it should be upheld and applied as having the
force and effect of law. Even if the rules are not deferred to for
that reason, the one-element test does not conflict with the doctrine
of claim preclusion. Therefore, the one-element test ought to be
applied by the courts in making a determination as to whether a
miner has had a material change in his condition for the purposes of
deciding whether or not that miner may bring a subsequent claim
for benefits.
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